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CHART 1  SOME INDICATORS OF GLOBALISATION IN THE 
INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES (1)
  (percentages of GDP, unless otherwise stated)
Sources : IMF, WTO.
(1)  The industrialised countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States.
(2)  Foreign direct investment and portfolio investment, sum of the assets and 
liabilities held abroad, as a percentage of GDP.
(3)  Total imports and exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.
Number of regional trade agreements 
(left-hand scale)
Financial integration (2) (left-hand scale)
Trade integration (3) (right-hand scale)
Introduction
A great many changes in the economic landscape are 
ascribed to globalisation. There can be no doubt that 
progressive globalisation has had a major inﬂ  uence  on 
economic developments worldwide, and will continue to 
do so, and that it presents some signiﬁ  cant challenges for 
economic policy.
However, globalisation is a complex phenomenon, lacking 
any clear-cut deﬁ  nition. In the current context, globalisa-
tion is deﬁ   ned as accelerating international economic 
integration, reﬂ  ected in stronger growth of international 
trade in goods and services and in increased mobility of 
capital and labour.
In recent decades, globalisation has speeded up as a result 
of the integration into the world economy of various large 
economies such as China, India and the new European 
Union Member States. There have been several contribu-
tory factors here. First, there has been rapid technological 
development, making it cheaper and quicker to exchange 
not only goods and services but also information. Also, 
the deliberate policy of liberalisation and deregulation 
in various countries has helped to accelerate globalisa-
tion. Instances include the gradual abolition of controls 
on capital movements in many countries and the sharp 
rise in the number of regional trade agreements since the 
mid-1990s, augmenting global trade and capital ﬂ  ows.
The openness of the industrialised countries, measured 
as the sum of their imports and exports, has increased 
rapidly in the past ten years from 35 p.c. of GDP to almost 
45 p.c. of GDP in 2005, having already risen sharply in 
the 1970s. The progress of ﬁ  nancial integration has been 
even more dramatic. Thus, in 2004 foreign direct invest-
ment and portfolio investment represented 124 p.c. of 
GDP, virtually triple the 1995 ﬁ  gure. There has therefore 
(1)  The author wishes to thank L. Aucremanne, A. Bruggeman and M. Collin for 














































CHART 2  INFLATION SINCE 1971 (1)
  (percentage changes compared to the previous year)
Sources : Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2005), ECB, IMF.




been a general acceleration in globalisation since the 
mid-1990s.
This article will now proceed to examine three potential 
effects of globalisation which may be important for mon-
etary policy. The ﬁ  rst section documents the current low 
and stable inﬂ  ation, and explains how globalisation has 
played a role here. The second section tries to establish 
whether globalisation is one of the factors contributing 
to the apparent decline in the sensitivity of inﬂ  ation to 
domestic economic activity. The separation of changes 
in the policy interest rates from long-term interest rate 
movements forms the subject of the third section. The 
fourth section investigates the possible implications for 
monetary policy, while the last section sums up the prin-
cipal ﬁ  ndings.
1.   Has globalisation exerted downward 
pressure on inﬂ  ation ?
Inﬂ   ation, measured by the consumer price index, has 
remained low and stable throughout the world since the 
mid-1990s. Having hovered around 10 p.c. in the indus-
trialised countries during the second half of the 1970s, 
inﬂ  ation eased steadily in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching 
a low of 1.4 p.c. in 1998. Since then, inﬂ  ation has risen 
slightly, although the increase has been very small against 
the background of a 300 p.c.-increase in oil prices. It is 
not only the level of inﬂ  ation that has declined : its volatil-
ity has also diminished, as a result of the fall in inﬂ  ation 
persistence, i.e. the degree to which current inﬂ  ation 
depends on its previous values  (1). This has reduced the 
impact of shocks on inﬂ  ation, because their effects are 
not felt for so long. The current low inﬂ  ation  appears 
to be a global phenomenon, although in the developing 
countries the decline in inﬂ  ation occurred later, only start-
ing in 1995.
1.1  Causes of low and stable inﬂ  ation
The improvement in the conduct of monetary policy is 
undoubtedly a major factor in the evident decline in both 
the level and the persistence of inﬂ  ation. The growing 
importance which the central banks of the industrial-
ised countries have attached to price stability since the 
1980s has been reﬂ   ected in a number of institutional 
changes, such as the independence of the central bank, 
the introduction of quantitative inﬂ  ation  targets,  and 
increased transparency. As a result of these changes, the 
central bank’s inﬂ   ation  target – whether  explicit  or  not – 
became a new, credible nominal anchor. That credibility 
was boosted further by the actual decline in inﬂ  ation 
recorded in the 1980s, so that inﬂ  ation expectations were 
more ﬁ  rmly anchored.
Apart from the improved conduct of monetary policy, 
another factor behind the lower inﬂ  ation may be positive 
productivity shocks, whether or not related to globalisa-
tion, which have temporarily moderated inﬂ  ation, and a 
more disciplined budgetary policy which has limited the 
inﬂ  ationary impact of that policy. Some economists also 
emphasise the role played by globalisation and greater 
international competition.
Firstly, Rogoff (2003) argues that globalisation inﬂ  uences 
the level of the equilibrium inﬂ   ation rate, because it 
reduces or even eliminates the inﬂ  ation bias. That bias 
corresponds to the higher than optimum inﬂ  ation level 
resulting from a central bank trying to bring the level of 
activity and employment closer to the perfect competi-
tion level by creating unexpected inﬂ  ation.  However, 
economic agents anticipate this central bank behaviour by 
adjusting their inﬂ  ation expectations, so that the eventual 
result is an unchanged level of activity and employment, 
with higher inﬂ   ation (Barro and Gordon, 1983). Since 
globalisation is leading to lower mark-ups on the product 
and labour markets, the central bank will be less inclined 
to stimulate the economy, so that the inﬂ  ation bias will 
decline. In addition, the real effects of monetary policy are 
(1)  For a discussion of inﬂ  ation persistence in the euro area, cf. Dhyne (2005).9
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more limited in a more competitive economy with more 
ﬂ  exible wages and prices, and that should also reduce 
the tendency of central banks to conduct an expansive 
monetary policy. If globalisation has caused a temporary 
decline in inﬂ  ation as well, that will have strengthened the 
credibility of monetary policy, making it easier to conduct 
that policy. Since globalisation has accelerated rapidly 
since the mid-1990s, that may explain the downward 
trend in inﬂ  ation, especially in the developing countries. In 
the industrialised countries, however, inﬂ  ation had already 
fallen to a low level during the 1980s.
Secondly, the emergence of the low-cost countries which 
has accompanied globalisation may have led the supply 
of products to increase faster than demand, thus having 
a moderating effect on the general level of prices. 
Conversely, however, monetary policy has been par-
ticularly accommodating in many parts of the world since 
2001, counterbalancing the growth of supply.
Although globalisation may perhaps not have had any 
great visible impact on aggregate inﬂ  ation in the industri-
alised countries, it has been accompanied by some major 
changes in the relative prices of products and production 
factors. Thus, the relative prices of commodities have risen 
sharply, while the emergence of the low-cost countries 
has pushed down the relative prices of manufactured 
goods. In addition, greater international competition has 
inﬂ  uenced wages and prices in the industrialised coun-
tries. Thus, it is reducing mark-ups in the product and 
labour markets, while the strong expansion of the labour 
supply is depressing the relative price of labour.
In principle, these relative price changes are neutral for 
overall inﬂ  ation, as falls in the relative prices of certain 
categories of products will be offset by increases in those 
relative prices of other products or services, partly because 
consumers use their higher purchasing power to buy other 
products, and vice versa. However, there may be tempo-
rary effects on the headline inﬂ  ation rate if some relative 
price changes are passed on more quickly than others, or 
if compensatory price changes take time to appear.
The next section discusses the relative price changes 
accompanying globalisation, dealing ﬁ  rst with the increases 
in the relative prices of commodities before illustrating the 
decline in the relative prices of manufactured goods.
1.2   Impact of globalisation on a number of relative 
prices in the industrialised countries
1.2.1   Impact of growing world demand for commodities
Driven by strong demand, emanating mainly from the 
United States and the emerging Asian economies, com-
modity prices have soared to unprecedented heights. 
Between January 2004 and June 2006, prices of crude 
oil and metals increased by 117 p.c. and 111 p.c. respec-
tively. The fact that those price rises were simultaneous 
indicates that the reasons lay primarily in demand rather 
than supply factors, since the latter are speciﬁ  c to each 
particular market. Since 1995 there has been a stronger 
correlation between the movements in the various com-
modity prices. While the correlation between the changes 
in crude oil and metal prices  (1) was only 0.06 over the 
period from January 1981 to December 1994, the cor-
relation was 0.54 between January 1995 and June 2006. 
In the more recent period, the pattern of crude oil prices 
has evidently been more closely linked to world economic 
growth, whereas in the past, world growth was only cor-
related with the movement in metal prices. This suggests 
that the current commodity price rises are largely due 
to globalisation and the associated strong demand for 
commodities. However, the possibility remains that geo-
political tensions and speculation may also have played 










































































CHART 3  COMMODITY PRICES AND WORLD GROWTH
  (monthly data in US dollars, unless otherwise stated ; 
percentage changes compared to the corresponding period 
of the previous year)
Source : IMF.
(1)  Annual data in volume terms.
Metals (left-hand scale)
Crude oil (left-hand scale)
World growth (right-hand scale) (1)
(1)  On the basis of an index published by the IMF giving the prices of copper, 





































































































CHART 4  TRANSMISSION OF COMMODITY PRICES TO IMPORT PRICES, PRODUCER PRICES AND CONSUMER PRICES IN THE 
INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES (1)
  (indices, monthly data (2))
Sources : IMF, HWWA, NBB.
(1)  The industrialised countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.





COMMODITY PRICES IMPORT PRICES
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high level. For instance, the sharp commodity market cor-
rection in May and June can be attributed largely to the 
unwinding of speculative positions.
The rise in crude oil prices has a direct effect on headline 
inﬂ   ation via the energy component of the consumer 
price index. In addition, indirect effects may also occur 
if the surge in commodity prices pushes up production 
costs of ﬁ  rms, and those increases are then passed on in 
selling prices. Finally, apart from the ﬁ  rst-round  effects 
mentioned, there may also be second-round effects, 
particularly if wage increases offset part of the loss of 
purchasing power resulting from the direct and indirect 
ﬁ  rst-round effects. If ﬁ  rms in turn pass on those wage 
increases in their selling prices, a price-wage spiral may be 
triggered, which not only augments the upward pressure 
on inﬂ  ation generated by an oil shock, but also makes it 
more persistent.
The direct inﬂ  uence of higher energy prices is consider-
able in the current low inﬂ  ation environment. For exam-
ple, the contribution of the energy component to overall 
inﬂ   ation in the euro area was 0.8 percentage point in 
2005, against an average of 0.2 percentage point from 11
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1991 to 1999. Despite this substantial direct effect, there 
do not appear to be any signiﬁ  cant indirect and second-
round effects as yet. For instance, consumer prices of non-
energy industrial goods and those of services increased 
by 0.3 p.c. and 2.1 p.c. respectively in the euro area 
in 2005.
This limited transmission of higher commodity prices to 
the later production stages emerges most clearly if four 
periods of rising commodity prices are compared. The 
periods considered begin respectively in October 1973 
(ﬁ   rst oil shock), October 1978 (second oil shock), 
February 1999 (previous increase in commodity prices) 
and January 2004 (current increase in commodity prices). 
This comparison reveals that, although the current com-
modity price rise is larger than in the previous periods of 
rising commodity prices, the transmission to later stages 
in the production process has been very limited in com-
parison with previous periods. Thus, over the 24 months 
following January 2004 (current commodity price rise), 
import prices increased by only 7.5 p.c., in stark contrast 
to the cumulative increase in import prices of 35.5 and 
44.1 p.c. respectively following the ﬁ  rst and second oil 
shocks. The picture is similar for producer and consumer 
prices during both the current and the previous period 
of rising commodity prices. Analysis of the movement in 
labour costs in various euro area countries during the con-
sidered periods of rising commodity prices shows that the 
increase in labour costs was also only modest during the 
current and previous phases of rising commodity prices, 
while that increase was very pronounced during and after 
the oil shocks of the 1970s. The absence of those second-
round effects in the more recent periods does much to 
explain the limited increase in inﬂ  ation following the steep 
commodity price rises.
Various factors can be put forward to explain that limited 
inﬂ  ationary impact of the commodity price rises. The ﬁ  rst 
which can be mentioned is the change in the monetary 
policy regime compared to the 1970s. The crucial impor-
tance which central banks now attach to price stability 
has made it possible to anchor inﬂ  ation expectations more 
ﬁ  rmly, so that rising commodity prices are not automati-
cally translated into higher inﬂ  ation expectations.
Secondly, structural changes in the industrialised econo-
mies also play a part in the reduced pass-through of com-
modity prices to consumer prices. In the ﬁ  rst place, indus-
try’s share of GDP has declined systematically over the past 
thirty years, in favour of the tertiary sector which is less 
commodity-intensive. Production of manufactured goods 
has been partly relocated to the low-cost countries, so 
that the industrialised countries have become less sensitive 
to ﬂ  uctuations in commodity prices. In addition, industry 
has become more efﬁ   cient in its use of commodities. 
Generally speaking, one unit of output nowadays requires 
a smaller quantity of commodities than in the 1970s.
Thirdly, globalisation may also be a factor in reducing the 
transmission of commodity prices to subsequent stages in 
the production process. The increased competition associ-
ated with globalisation makes it more difﬁ  cult for ﬁ  rms to 
raise their selling prices when commodity prices increase. 
However, from the theoretical angle, it must be said that, 
in principle, this can only be a temporary phenomenon, 
conﬁ   ned to the phase in which mark-ups are reduced 
to the level of perfect competition. Once the mark-ups 
have been cut, ﬁ  rms will feel a greater need than previ-
ously to increase their selling prices when production 
costs rise. However, it is not very likely that mark-ups 
have already been reduced to that extent. In addition, 
the threat of the relocation of production to the low-cost 
countries has a moderating inﬂ  uence on wage demands, 
even after a steep rise in energy prices, and that tempers 
inﬂ   ation. Finally, it is possible that the transmission of 
commodity price rises is compensated by the falling prices 
of imported labour-intensive goods from the low-cost 
countries. That aspect of globalisation will be discussed in 
the next section.
1.2.2   Impact of increased supply of labour-intensive 
goods
Globalisation is often associated with downward pres-
sure on the relative prices of imported labour-intensive 
goods (cf. Kamin, Marazzi and Schindler, 2006). In fact, 
globalisation has meant a considerable expansion in the 
world’s production capacity, greatly increasing the low-
cost countries’ share of world trade. As a direct conse-
quence, import prices rise more slowly the larger the share 
of ﬁ  nal imports originating from the low-cost countries. 
This direct effect on inﬂ  ation impacts mainly on the non-
energy industrial goods component of the consumer price 
index. Cheaper intermediate imports from the low-cost 
countries may also depress production costs of domestic 
ﬁ   rms, generating an indirect, moderating inﬂ  uence  on 
inﬂ  ation if these lower production costs are passed on in 
selling prices. In addition, keener international competi-
tion may inhibit inﬂ  ation temporarily via four other chan-
nels. First, domestic ﬁ  rms may have to cut their proﬁ  t mar-
gins in order to remain competitive on the international 
market. Second, globalisation has a moderating inﬂ  uence 
on real wage increases, because employees feel the com-
petition from a very large group of potential workers, and 
employers are not inclined to grant real wage increases 
because they want to remain competitive. Third, stronger 
international competition can also drive up productivity 




































CHART 5  GEOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE OF EURO AREA 
IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURED GOODS
  (percentage of imports by value from outside the euro area)
Sources : EC and own calculations.
(1)  The high-cost countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
(2)  The low-cost countries are the other countries outside the euro area.
High-cost countries (1)
Low-cost countries (2)
Box 1  –  Impact of low-cost countries on inﬂ  ation in industrialised countries
This box discusses a number of studies which try to investigate how the growing share of imports from low-cost 
countries inﬂ  uences inﬂ  ation in the industrialised countries.
On the basis of a regression analysis, Kamin et al. (2006) show a statistically signiﬁ  cant, negative correlation be-
tween sectoral import price inﬂ  ation in the United States and the change in China’s share of imports in the sector 
concerned. Their estimates suggest that, in view of the observed increase in that country’s share of US imports, 
China has exerted downward pressure of around 0.8  percentage point per annum on import price inﬂ  ation in the 
United States over the past decade. Using a different methodology, Kamin et al. (2006) calculated China’s contri-
bution to import price inﬂ  ation in the case of goods for a large number of industrialised countries. For this purpose, 
the annual average import price inﬂ  ation over the period 1993-2001 was broken down into China’s contribution 
and that of the rest of the world. The ﬁ  ndings reveal that Chinese imports exerted downward pressure averaging 
1.03  percentage points per annum in the United States over the period considered. However, China’s contribution 
to goods import price inﬂ  ation depends very much on China’s weight in those imports. For example, in the case 
of Belgium, where imports from China represented only 2.7 p.c. in 2001, China’s contribution to import price 
inﬂ  ation is estimated at only -0.29 percentage point per annum.
invest more heavily in research and development in order 
to boost productivity, and that in turn produces a cost 
advantage. In addition, growing international specialisa-
tion permits the exploitation of comparative advantages. 
Finally, the decline in the relative prices of manufactured 
goods could possibly produce second-round effects. The 
changing geographical structure of imports of manufac-
tured goods from outside the euro area is outlined below. 
The downward pressure which the rising share of imports 
from low-cost countries exerts on relative prices at the 
various stages of production will then be illustrated for 
two speciﬁ  c product categories.
If euro area imports of manufactured goods  (1) from 
countries outside the euro area are broken down into 
those from high-cost countries and those from low-cost 
countries, the share represented by the low-cost countries 
has clearly risen over the period 1995 to 2005. In terms of 
the value of imports of manufactured goods from outside 
the euro area, the share of the low-cost countries in total 
imports increased from 38 p.c. to 53 p.c. over the period 
considered. We can expect this rising share of imports 
from the low-cost countries to have a moderating effect 
on import prices of manufactured goods and, at a later 
stage, on producer and consumer prices. The next sec-
tion illustrates this for two speciﬁ  c  product  categories 
where the share of imports from low-cost countries rose 
sharply over the period considered, while Box 1 discusses 
a number of studies which attempt to estimate the 
mechanical impact on aggregate inﬂ  ation of the integra-
tion of the low-cost countries.
4
(1)  Imports of manufactured goods correspond to imports under headings 5 to 8 of 
the SITC classiﬁ  cation.13
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In the latest issue of its “Economic Outlook”, the OECD estimates the impact of cheaper imports from China 
and South-East Asia on the deﬂ  ator of domestic demand in the euro area and the United States (OECD 2006). 
According to the OECD calculations, imports from Asia have inhibited the rise in the deﬂ  ator of domestic demand 
in the euro area and the United States over the period 2001-2005 by 0.28 and 0.11 percentage points respectively. 
In the ﬁ  rst half of the 1990s, this moderating effect was only 0.03 percentage point for both economies, whereas 
in the second half of the 1990s imports from Asia made a positive contribution of 0.05 percentage point in the 
euro area and a negative contribution of 0.12 percentage point in the United States.
According to the IMF (IMF, 2006), for a panel of advanced economies, a fall in the real import price has only a 
limited effect on consumer price inﬂ  ation, and the effect disappears relatively quickly, namely after about three 
years. Simulations based on these estimates show that the faster than average fall in import prices (excluding oil) 
during the period 1997-2005 exerted downward pressure on inﬂ  ation averaging 0.16 percentage point in a group 
of advanced economies. For the United States, this moderating effect is estimated at 0.46 percentage point.
Overall, the estimated effects of globalisation on aggregate inﬂ  ation appear to be limited, but are also heavily 
dependent on the period in question, the methodology used and the price index considered.
BREAKDOWN OF ANNUAL AVERAGE IMPORT PRICE INFLATION OVER THE PERIOD 1993-2001
(Percentage points, unless otherwise stated)
Total import price 
inﬂation (1)
Effect of the rest 
of the world
Effect of China China’s share in 
1993 (1)




Belgium .................. –0.75 –0.48 –0.29 1.8 2.7 0.9
France ................... –1.40 –1.36 –0.04 2.6 4.1 1.5
Germany ................. –1.74 –1.56 –0.16 3.5 4.8 1.3
Japan .................... –0.75 0.44 –1.19 10.3 20.6 10.3
United States ............. 0.44 1.48 –1.03 9.2 14.3 5.1
Source: Kamin et al. (2006).
(1) Percentages.
In value terms, the share of the low-cost countries in the 
textile product category has risen steadily, from 60 p.c. in 
1995 to 76 p.c. in 2005. This high and growing share of 
imports was reﬂ  ected in declining relative import prices, 
measured on the basis of unit values over the period 
considered. In real terms, textile import prices have fallen 
by 20 p.c. over the past ten years. This decline in relative 
import prices also lowered the relative producer and con-
sumer prices of those products. However, the fall in con-
sumer prices was less steep, since domestic costs in the 
production stage and transport and distribution margins 
displayed a more neutral pattern.
The share of imports from low-cost countries in tech-
nological products showed an even more dramatic rise, 
namely from 36 p.c. in 1995 to 71 p.c. in 2005. Relative 
import prices, measured on the basis of unit values, 
declined sharply in this sector, falling by around 25 p.c. In 
this product category there has also been major techno-
logical progress, enabling these products to be produced 
more cheaply. The corresponding items in the producer 
and consumer price index recorded an even sharper fall. 
The discrepancy between the trend in the unit values of 
imports and the movement in producer and consumer 
prices may perhaps be due largely to differences in 
adjustments for changes in product quality. Unit values of 




















































































































CHART 6  DECLINE IN RELATIVE PRICES OF TEXTILES AND TECHNOLOGICAL PRODUCTS IN THE EURO AREA (1)
  (Indices 1995=100, unless otherwise stated; annual data)
Sources : EC and own calculations.
(1)  Prices deflated by the HICP.
(2)  The categories for import prices, producer prices and the HICP are respectively “Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles not elsewhere specified and related products", 
"Manufacture of textiles and clothing” and “Clothing”.
(3)  The categories for import prices, producer prices and the HICP are respectively “Telecommunication and sound recording and reproduction equipment and appliances”, 
”Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment" and "Sound and video recording and reproducing apparatus".
(4)  Import prices are unit values.
(5)  The low-cost countries are all countries outside the euro area except Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States




Share of imports from low-cost countries (right-hand scale) (5)
 (6)
(left-hand scale)
TEXTILES (2) TECHNOLOGICAL PRODUCTS (3)
may be subject to an upward bias, whereas the producer 
and consumer price indices are adjusted.
These price movements show that globalisation has inﬂ  u-
enced certain import prices and that the decline in relative 
prices is being passed on in consumer prices. According 
to the studies discussed in Box 1, however, these relative 
price falls have only a minor effect on aggregate inﬂ  ation, 
although that impact is difﬁ  cult to quantify precisely.
2.   Has globalisation reduced the 
amplitude of cyclical ﬂ  uctuations in 
inﬂ  ation ?
2.1   A weaker link between inﬂ  ation and the 
domestic economic cycle
Inﬂ  ation  is  inﬂ   uenced to some extent by the level of 
economic activity or the business climate, and more par-
ticularly by the volume of excess demand measured in 
terms of the output gap (1). Other factors, such as inﬂ  ation 
expectations and the impact of cost-push shocks, also 
help to explain inﬂ  ation. The link between inﬂ  ation and 
the business cycle is generally illustrated by means of the 
Phillips curve  (2). The following equation can be estimated 
for the euro area :
πt = μ + ρπt–1 + βGAPt–1 + εt
where π represents the year-on-year change in the HICP, 
GAP corresponds to the output gap and ε represents an 
error term which allows, in particular, for the effect of 
cost-push shocks not included in the model. The estimated 
parameters are μ, ρ and β, or respectively the constant, 
the autoregressive component of inﬂ  ation, which meas-
ures inﬂ  ation persistence, and the slope of the estimated 
Phillips curve. This equation is estimated on the basis of 
(1)  The output gap is deﬁ  ned as the percentage difference between real and 
potential GDP. The next section proxies potential GDP by applying a Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁ  lter (with a smoothing parameter of 1600) to real GDP on a quarterly 
basis.
(2)  For a description of the development of the Phillips curve in Belgium, the euro 
area and the United States, cf. NBB (2002).15















































CHART 7  COEFFICIENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE OUTPUT 
GAP IN THE EURO AREA
  (slope of the estimated Phillips curve for a series of moving 
twenty-year periods (1))
Sources : Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2005), OECD and own calculations.
(1)  For each twenty-year period, ending in the quarter considered, the estimated 
coefficient β is obtained from the following equation : 
πt = μ + ρπt–1 + βGAPt–1 + εt
Estimated  coefficient associated with the output gap
95% confidence interval
output gap had a smaller inﬂ  uence on inﬂ  ation over the 
period 1993-2005, compared to 1980-1992. However, 
the size of the change varies greatly between countries. 
In Belgium, for example, a 1 p.c. larger output gap 
would have implied a cumulative effect on inﬂ  ation of 
0.45 percentage point in the 1980s, whereas in the 1990s 
the effect would have ceased to be signiﬁ  cant. In Italy, the 
United Kingdom, Norway, New Zealand and Sweden, the 
reduction in the cumulative impact would have been even 
greater, whereas an increase can be recorded for France 
and Australia. Generally speaking, however, inﬂ  ation has 
become less sensitive to the domestic output gap.
2.2   Possible reasons for the ﬂ  atter Phillips curve
Various factors can be put forward to explain the ﬂ  atten-
ing of the Phillips curve. A ﬁ  rst series of factors can be 
attributed to the fact that the monetary policy geared to 
price stability may have exerted downward pressure on 
the slope of the Phillips curve. First, the economic agents 
do not revise their inﬂ  ation expectations, or only slightly, 
in the light of changing economic conditions if there is 
a credible monetary policy maintaining price stability, so 
that the ﬂ  uctuations in inﬂ  ation itself are limited. Also, 
the greater importance which central bankers have come 
to attach to price stability has probably also implied better 
control over the inﬂ  ationary impact of cost-push shocks. 
This has led to lower inﬂ  ation variance, at the expense of 
higher output gap variance. In contrast to demand shocks, 
cost-push shocks oblige policy-makers to choose between 
stabilising inﬂ   ation or stabilising economic activity. The 
increased variance in the output gap combined with 
the lower inﬂ  ation variance results, ex post, in a ﬂ  atter 
Phillips curve. Finally, the lower and less volatile inﬂ  ation 
may have encouraged ﬁ  rms to adjust their prices less fre-
quently, and that in turn results in a ﬂ  atter Phillips curve.
Structural changes in the production processes in the 
economies considered may be a second key reason for 
the ﬂ  atter Phillips curve, because more ﬂ  exible production 
processes mean that output can be changed across the eco-
nomic cycle without causing major ﬂ  uctuations in marginal 
costs, which in turn reduces the ﬂ  uctuations in inﬂ  ation  (2).
Globalisation may be a third signiﬁ   cant reason for the 
ﬂ  atter Phillips curve. Indeed, the ﬂ  attening of the Phillips 
curve does seem to be a global phenomenon, which 
(1)  This cumulative impact corresponds to β(1 + ρ + ρ2 + ρ3), since inﬂ  ation 
persistence implies that the effect of a higher output gap has a longer lasting 
impact on inﬂ  ation. Thus, the change in the cumulative inﬂ  ationary impact of the 
output gap is a combination of the change in the estimated direct impact (β) and 
the change in the estimated inﬂ  ation persistence (ρ).
(2)  The microeconomic basis of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve links current 
inﬂ  ation in the ﬁ  rst instance to the deviations in real marginal costs from 
their equilibrium level. Under certain conditions, these show a positive, linear 
correlation with the output gap, so that the Phillips curve is often expressed in 
terms of this last variable.
quarterly data for the euro area for a series of moving 
twenty-year periods. Each period therefore covers eighty 
quarters and moves by one quarter at a time. This exercise 
shows that the Phillips curve becomes ﬂ  atter the more 
recent the period considered. While the estimated slope of 
the Phillips curve (β) was 0.35 between the ﬁ  rst quarter of 
1971 and the fourth quarter of 1990, that value dropped 
to 0.09 for the last period considered, namely from the 
ﬁ   rst quarter of 1986 to the fourth quarter of 2005.
The ﬂ  attening of the traditional Phillips curve, expressed 
in terms of the domestic output gap, evident in the euro 
area, appears to be a global phenomenon, as the impact 
of the output gap on inﬂ  ation is declining in a large group 
of industrialised countries. That is clear from estimation of 
the above equation for a large number of industrialised 
countries for two periods, namely one which runs from 
the ﬁ  rst quarter of 1980 to the fourth quarter of 1992, 
and a second running from the ﬁ   rst quarter of 1993 
to the fourth quarter of 2005. These estimates show 
that the direct effect on inﬂ   ation of a 1 p.c. increase 
in the output gap (β) has declined in the majority of 
the industrialised countries considered. The cumulative 
impact on inﬂ   ation of a 1 p.c. increase in the output 
gap was also calculated over a one-year period on the 
basis of the estimated parameters  (1). In fourteen of the 
sixteen industrialised countries concerned, the domestic 16
therefore demands a global explanation. First, in a globally 
integrated economy, the prices of a growing number of 
goods and services are determined by global rather than 
purely domestic demand and supply factors. Changes 
in demand for goods and services can then, at least to 
some extent, be met by foreign production, reducing 
the inﬂ  ationary pressure of domestic origin. Furthermore, 
strong foreign competition may curtail the market power 
of domestic ﬁ  rms, so that they can only introduce modest 
price increases during an economic upturn. The same 
reasoning applies to wages  : in an improved economic 
climate, wage demands will also be modest owing to the 
real or virtual threat of relocation. In theory, just as in the 
case discussed before, the moderating inﬂ  uence on the 
cyclical pattern of inﬂ  ation exerted by the reduction in 
market power would be conﬁ  ned to the phase in which 
mark-ups are being reduced. Once mark-ups are sufﬁ  -
ciently low, ﬁ  rms are obliged to pass on cost increases, so 
that in the long run globalisation could actually increase 
the cyclical variations in inﬂ  ation.
In the latest issue of its “World Economic Outlook”, the 
IMF tries to determine the relative importance of the 
various factors which may lie behind the ﬂ  attening  of 
the domestic Phillips curve (IMF, 2006). The results, based 
on a panel of nine industrialised countries, indicate that 
greater openness and increased monetary policy cred-
ibility account each for about half of the reduction in the 
slope of the Phillips curve.
According to Borio and Filardo (2006), global demand and 
supply factors now play a greater role in explaining cyclical 
inﬂ  ation movements. By extending the Phillips curve to 
include a global output gap, which is a yardstick for the 
business climate in the rest of the world, and estimating 
this for a panel of seventeen industrialised countries over 
a series of moving periods, they ﬁ  nd that the coefﬁ  cient 
for the global output gap increases if more recent periods 
are taken into account. Although the results must be 
interpreted with a degree of caution, they appear to indi-
cate that global demand and supply factors are playing 
an increasingly important role in the cyclical movements 
in inﬂ  ation, especially when observations since 2000 are 
taken into account  (1).
Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005) have shown that, for a large 
number of industrialised countries, the national inﬂ  ation 
ﬁ  gures are attracted by a global inﬂ  ation measure, which 
in itself accounts for almost 70  p.c. of the variance in the 
national inﬂ  ation ﬁ  gures. They also found indications of a 
global Phillips curve in the sense that global inﬂ  ation can 
be partly attributed to global activity, measured on the 
basis of the rate of growth in industrial output. These two 
ﬁ  ndings suggest that global factors play an important role 
in determining domestic inﬂ  ation.
Overall, there are therefore ample indications that inﬂ  ation 
has become less cyclical. However, since there are many 
potential factors which may explain this development, it 


























































































CHART 8  DECLINE IN THE IMPACT OF THE OUTPUT GAP ON INFLATION
  (the arrow indicates the change between the periods 1980-1992 and 1993-2005)
Sources : Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2005), IMF, OECD and own calculations.
(1)  For each period, the change in the estimated coefficient β is indicated by the following equation : πt = μ + ρπt–1 + βGAPt–1 + εt
(2)  The change in  β(1 + ρ + ρ² + ρ³) is shown for each period on the basis of the estimated coefficients obtained from the following equation : πt = μ + ρπt–1 + βGAPt–1 + εt
DIRECT IMPACT (1) CUMULATIVE IMPACT OVER ONE YEAR (2)17
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is difﬁ  cult to establish the exact marginal contribution of 
each factor and, more speciﬁ  cally, the extent to which this 
phenomenon is inﬂ  uenced by progressive globalisation.
3.   Has globalisation severed the link 
between ofﬁ  cial interest rates and 
long-term interest rates ?
In recent years, long-term interest rates in the industrial-
ised countries have displayed much greater similarity than 
they used to. Although the upward and downward trends 
often occurred in parallel in the 1970s and 1980s, there 
were still substantial differences of level. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, these interest rate differences largely reﬂ  ected 
the divergences in the level of inﬂ  ation  between  the 
various countries. However, if the analysis focuses on the 
changes in long-term interest rates, that again reveals a 
closer correlation in the recent period. Although the coef-
ﬁ  cients of correlation – calculated for a series of moving 
24-month periods – between the changes in long-term 
interest rates in the United States and those in the euro 
area (1) present a decidedly volatile picture, a number of 
tendencies nevertheless emerge. For the series of periods 
ending between 1969 and 1980, the moving coefﬁ  cient 
of correlation ﬂ   uctuated widely around an average of 
0.21, but without exhibiting any marked tendency. For 
the series of periods ending between 1981 and 1994, the 
average correlation coefﬁ  cient of 0.51 was considerably 
higher, though once again there was no clearly discern-
ible trend. In contrast, since the mid-1990s, the moving 
correlation coefﬁ  cient has continued rising to an average 
of 0.72 for the series of periods ending between 1995 
and 2006. Moreover, an upward trend is apparent, so 
that the correlation coefﬁ   cient was around 0.8 in the 
last period considered. This is clear evidence that changes 
in long-term interest rates are indeed becoming more 
synchronised.
In view of this increased international coherence in inter-
est rates, the question is to what extent long-term inter-
est rate changes in the euro area are still connected with 
adjustments to the main Eurosystem interest rates. The 
moving correlation coefﬁ  cients between changes in the 
overnight interest rate and the long-term interest rate, 
again calculated over 24-month periods, indicate that the 
closer international links between long-term interest rates 
do not necessarily mean that the correlation between 
changes in the long-term interest rate and the overnight 
rate is diminishing in the euro area. This correlation was 
already very small in Germany for the periods ending 
between 1969 and 1994, and that may be due to the 
credibility of German monetary policy  (2). Nevertheless, 
this correlation is slightly negative for the series of periods 
ending between 1995 and 2006. Yet the same pattern is 
apparent in the United States, indicating that the weak 
link between the ofﬁ  cial interest rate and the long-term 
interest rate is not a purely European phenomenon, 
attributable to the dominant inﬂ  uence of the American 
long-term interest rate. The long-term interest rate in the 
United States rose by only 40 basis points over the period 
from June 2004 to May 2006, while the Federal Reserve 































































































CHART 9  CORRELATION BETWEEN CHANGES IN THE 
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATE IN THE EURO AREA 
AND CHANGES IN THE LONG-TERM RATES IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE OVERNIGHT RATE 
IN THE EURO AREA RESPECTIVELY (1) 
  (moving correlation coefficient for 24-month periods (2))
Source : BIS and own calculations.
(1)  Euro area for the period 1999-2006 and Germany for the period 1967-1998.
(2)  24-month periods ending during the month considered.
CORRELATION WITH THE OVERNIGHT INTEREST 
RATE IN THE EURO AREA (1)
CORRELATION WITH THE LONG-TERM INTEREST 
RATE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1)  Euro area for the period 1999-2006 and Germany for the period 1967-1998.
(2)  Christiansen and Pigott (1997) put forward some arguments on this subject.18
A possible explanation for the severing of the link 
between the ofﬁ   cial interest rates and the long-term 
rates is the fact that inﬂ  ation expectations are more ﬁ  rmly 
anchored, so that ﬂ  uctuations in the short-term interest 
rate are seen as a short-term phenomenon, and therefore 
do not trigger adjustments to the long-term rate.
In addition, progressive globalisation has been a factor 
depressing especially the yield on US government bonds. 
The substantial savings surplus built up by the emerging 
economies and oil-producing countries is used partly to 
ﬁ   nance the American economy’s large savings deﬁ  cit. 
Since 2000, foreign demand for US government bonds 
has soared, with most of that increased demand originat-
ing from ofﬁ   cial bodies. The Asian countries have also 
been holding more US government bonds since 2000, 
probably because of the policy of the Asian central banks, 
aimed at preventing their currency from appreciating. 
Although it is not possible to give an accurate estimate of 
how these capital ﬂ  ows to the United States have affected 
the long-term interest rate, it seems highly likely that the 
strong demand from the Asian central banks has had 
a signiﬁ  cant  downward  inﬂ   uence on the US long-term 
interest rate.
The situation of ample liquidity combined with increased 
risk aversion on the ﬁ  nancial markets following the heavy 
stock market losses of 2000-2002 also contributed to 
the strong demand for long-dated government bonds. 
In addition, insurance companies and pension funds 
want to match the maturity of their assets more closely 
to that of their liabilities, in accordance with the new 
IAS / IFRS accounting rules, so that they, too, are generat-
ing stronger demand for risk-free government paper with 
a fairly long maturity.
4.   Potential implications for monetary 
policy
This section examines the potential monetary policy impli-
cations of the three economic trends discussed above, 
and their link to globalisation.
As regards the low and stable inﬂ  ation, it can be said that, 
certainly in the industrialised countries, this has more to do 
with the improved conduct of monetary policy than with 
increasing globalisation. However, the latter is associated 
with substantial changes in the relative prices of products 
and production factors. In principle, such changes in rela-
tive prices are neutral for inﬂ  ation in the longer term, but 
in the shorter term they may have some effect. Moreover, 
since globalisation is a gradual and progressive process, 
it remains possible that – in the end – inﬂ  ation over a 
fairly long period will have been (and will continue to 
be) inﬂ   uenced by a succession of effects which, taken 
individually, are generally short-lived. However, the net 
impact of these short-term effects is difﬁ  cult to discern. 
Nonetheless, Box 2 makes a number of points which sug-
gest that the effect of globalisation via imports may have 
been slightly positive in the euro area over the past seven 
years (1999-2005), but signiﬁ  cantly smaller than is implied 
by the deviation between headline inﬂ   ation and the 
underlying trend in inﬂ  ation. Moreover, inﬂ  ation has also 
been curbed, in particular, by wage moderation so that 
globalisation has also inﬂ  uenced domestic inﬂ  ation. The 
overall effect has therefore probably been downwards, 
but it is difﬁ  cult to identify ex post because the accommo-
dating monetary policy stance in many parts of the world 
has counterbalanced it. Furthermore, that overall effect 
may vary over time, and may sometimes even change 
its sign, making economic analysis and hence monetary 
policy more complex.
In this context, the challenge for monetary policy lies in 
tolerating the direct and indirect effects of such relative 
price changes, while at the same time preventing the 
emergence of second-round effects. Nowadays, most 
central banks tolerate the ﬁ  rst-round effects of an upward 
relative price shock. For example, they do not react 
immediately by raising interest rates if inﬂ  ation exceeds 
their target as a result of a steep rise in commodity prices, 
but do so only if they see a danger of second-round 
effects. The downward relative price shocks which may 
result from globalisation require, mutatis mutandis, a 
similar response although the symmetry of this reasoning 
is sometimes questioned. In other words, the ﬁ  rst-round 
effects of a positive supply shock should also be tolerated, 
and therefore need not trigger an immediate easing of 
monetary policy unless declining inﬂ  ation  expectations 
could culminate in deﬂ  ation.
Indeed, globalisation is often associated with risks of 
deﬂ   ation, and the response to that takes many forms. 
For instance, the IMF (2006) advocates a sufﬁ  ciently high 
inﬂ   ation target, so that positive supply shocks do not 
entail an imminent danger of deﬂ  ation  (1). Others, such as 
White (2006), ask whether the inﬂ  ation target should not 
be lowered instead, to take account of the fact that glo-
balisation is a gradual process, and may thus tend to curb 
inﬂ  ation over a fairly long period. If insufﬁ  cient account 
is taken of the ﬁ  rst-round character of that moderating 
inﬂ  uence, monetary policy is liable to be too expansionary, 
and thus contribute to imbalances on the ﬁ  nancial and 
real estate markets.
(1)  In this connection, reference may also be made to the background studies on the 
zero lower bound of the nominal interest rate, conducted during the assessment 
of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy (ECB, 2003). These studies reveal that the 
ECB’s current quantitative inﬂ  ation target (inﬂ  ation below but close to 2 p.c.) is 
sufﬁ  ciently high to cushion the impact of deﬂ  ationary shocks.19
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BOX 2  –  Inﬂ  ation indicators in a context of globalisation
Headline inﬂ  ation  –  in the euro area it is the HICP  –  is fully affected by the short-term impact of the relative price 
changes resulting from globalisation. That is precisely why measures of the underlying trend in inﬂ  ation are often 
used, since they generally have the characteristic of being less inﬂ  uenced by the impact of relative price changes. 
Moreover, they are also deemed to measure inﬂ  ationary pressure of domestic origin.
However, the traditional measure of the underlying inﬂ  ation trend, namely the HICP excluding unprocessed food 
and energy, takes the relative price changes caused by globalisation asymmetrically into account, so that its 
relevance for measuring domestic inﬂ  ationary pressure was recently called into question (ECB, 2005). The meas-
ure in fact discards the effect of higher energy prices while retaining the full downward inﬂ  uence on prices of 
manufactured goods  : both the effect via cheaper imports and that via domestic cost reduction. In contrast, the 
GDP deﬂ  ator measures only the movement in the price of domestic value added, so that – in principle – it is 
not affected by changes in import prices, and is only subject to any effects which globalisation exerts on domestic 
prices, either via wage moderation or by driving up productivity or squeezing proﬁ  t margins. By comparing the 
underlying inﬂ  ation trend with the GDP deﬂ  ator, it is therefore possible to form an overall idea of how cheaper 
imports of manufactured goods inﬂ  uence inﬂ  ation. If underlying inﬂ  ation is lower than the percentage change in 
the GDP deﬂ  ator, one can conclude that cheaper imports of labour-intensive goods have made a substantial nega-
tive contribution to inﬂ  ation. However, it must be said that the GDP deﬂ  ator takes account of the price movement 
of all value added, and not only that included in private consumption.
Taking the period 1999-2005  as a whole, the underlying inﬂ  ation trend was below the percentage increase in the 
GDP deﬂ  ator, indicating that the impact of import prices on the underlying inﬂ  ation trend was negative. This ef-
fect averaged -0.2  percentage point per annum for the period 1995-2005. Overall, in the present circumstances, 
the underlying inﬂ  ation trend does appear to underestimate domestic inﬂ  ationary pressure. That underestimate is 
somewhat greater than the overestimate of domestic inﬂ  ationary pressure which would arise if headline inﬂ  ation 
were taken as the basis, since that one was, on average, 0.1  percentage point higher than the GDP deﬂ  ator over 
the period considered.
The effect of changes in relative prices generated via the import channel was even more marked in 2005. The 
upward effect of imported energy is estimated at 0.7  percentage point, whereas the downward effect via imports 
of manufactured goods came to 0.3 percentage point. In all, this analysis appears to indicate that, over the past 
six years, the net effect of globalisation on headline inﬂ  ation measured by the HICP, induced via the movement in 
INFLATION INDICATORS IN THE EURO AREA
(percentage changes compared to the previous year) 
Average for the period 1999-2005 2005






GDP deﬂator ............................... 1.9 1.8
Underlying trend in inﬂation (2) ................ 1.7 1.5
p.m. Unit labour costs ....................... 1.6 1.3
Source: EC.
(1) Measured by the HICP.
(2) Measured by the HICP excluding unprocessed food and energy.
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the import prices of both commodities and manufactured goods, was slightly positive at 0.1 percentage point per 
annum, while in 2005 it was more positive, at 0.4 percentage point. However, these effects are far smaller than 
those calculated on the basis of the difference between headline inﬂ  ation and the underlying inﬂ  ation trend.
A major shortcoming of the proposed analysis is that it takes no account of the effect of globalisation on the prices 
of domestic value added. However, by comparing the movement in the prices of the various components of the 
GDP deﬂ  ator, it is possible to examine how the remuneration of the various production factors has changed. This 
reveals that, in the euro area, the rise in unit labour costs has systematically lagged behind the movement in the 
GDP deﬂ  ator in recent years, pointing to a decline in the share of value added represented by wages. This trend 
is probably connected with globalisation, since the expansion of the global labour supply in principle depresses 
the relative price of labour.
An alternative consists in leaving the inﬂ  ation  target 
unchanged, in view of its crucial role as a nominal 
anchor, but using it sufﬁ  ciently ﬂ  exible, so that there is no 
automatic response to a deviation between realised inﬂ  a-
tion and the inﬂ   ation target. This requires an in-depth 
analysis of the inﬂ  ation picture, to permit identiﬁ  cation 
of the more fundamental trend in inﬂ  ation, disregarding 
the ﬁ   rst-round effects caused by globalisation. For this 
purpose, the analysis of the risks to price stability should 
be based on the broadest possible range of information 
and indicators. This broad analysis is not only an essential 
foundation for the conduct of monetary policy, it also 
serves as the basis for communication concerning the 
policy pursued, so that it helps to ensure that both the 
nature of the shocks and any deviation between observed 
inﬂ   ation and the inﬂ   ation target are seen in their true 
light. This should help to safeguard the credibility of the 
central bank, even if inﬂ  ation does deviate temporarily 
from the target.
The ﬁ  ndings concerning the ﬂ  atter Phillips curve and the 
weaker link between ofﬁ  cial interest rates and long-term 
rates suggest that, in recent years, there has been a decline 
in the effectiveness of monetary policy via the traditional 
interest rate channel. In fact, a change in inﬂ  ation requires 
a larger change in the output gap, which – assuming 
that output gaps are inﬂ  uenced primarily by long-term 
interest rates – in turn requires a larger change in the 
ofﬁ  cial interest rate.
However, the interpretation need not be so negative. Both 
the ﬂ  atter Phillips curve and the weaker link between ofﬁ  -
cial interest rates and long-term rates appear to be largely 
due to the improved conduct of monetary policy and the 
associated increased credibility of the central bank. Yet 
this also means that those changes are not necessarily 
permanent, and could rapidly vanish if monetary policy 
were to lose its credibility by aiming to over-stimulate 
economic activity on the assumption that the effect on 
inﬂ  ation is limited.
Moreover, there is a possibility that a number of struc-
tural changes beyond the inﬂ  uence of the central bank, 
including globalisation, have played a part in explaining 
the ﬂ  attening of the Phillips curve and the severing of 
the link with the long-term interest rate. Even then, the 
consequences of weaker transmission via the traditional 
interest rate channel are not clear-cut. In the ﬁ  rst instance, 
it is mainly cost-push shocks that could give rise to prob-
lems, since a ﬂ   atter Phillips curve implies that demand 
shocks simultaneously have a smaller inﬂ  ationary impact 
than before and require a more modest policy response. 
Secondly, one of the possible causes of a ﬂ  atter Phillips 
curve, namely the diminished extent to which cost factors 
are passed on in prices, and the associated increase in 
price rigidity, is in principle only a temporary phenomenon 
which occurs exclusively during the period when mark-
ups are being cut. Once mark-ups have been pruned, 
the economy should have become more ﬂ  exible  than 
it was initially. During the transitional phase, this phe-
nomenon also limits the inﬂ  ationary impact of cost-push 
shocks. Thirdly, monetary policy can try to strengthen 
its grip on the long-term interest rate by clear commu-
nication regarding the economic and monetary analysis 
conducted, the risks to price stability and – if deemed 
appropriate – forthcoming  monetary  policy  decisions 
(Woodford, 2005). Finally, it must be remembered that 
there are many other transmission channels not discussed 
here, and their effectiveness may not have been impaired 
by globalisation.21
GLOBALISATION AND MONETARY POLICY
Conclusion
Globalisation, which has accelerated sharply since the 
mid-1990s, has brought some signiﬁ  cant economic devel-
opments. This article examined three possible effects of 
globalisation which could be relevant for monetary policy. 
It also discussed the possible monetary policy implications 
of the three trends examined.
The low and stable inﬂ  ation appears to be due to the 
improved conduct of monetary policy rather than pro-
gressive globalisation. However, the integration of the 
emerging economies is associated with substantial relative 
price changes. The relative prices of commodities have 
risen while those of labour-intensive goods have declined. 
Although, in the longer term, these relative price changes 
are neutral, in principle, for inﬂ  ation, they may still present 
a challenge for monetary policy. In a context of globali-
sation, it is therefore more necessary than ever for the 
analysis underlying monetary policy to be based on the 
broadest possible range of information and indicators, so 
as to identify the more fundamental risks to price stability, 
both upward and downward, in due time.
The ﬂ  attening of the classical Phillips curve observed in 
the euro area appears to be a global phenomenon which 
can be explained both by the improved conduct of mon-
etary policy and by structural changes in the industrial 
economies, including globalisation. A ﬂ  atter Philips curve 
suggests that bringing inﬂ  ation down entails higher short-
term costs in terms of output. However, this ﬁ  nding needs 
to be qualiﬁ  ed, since the ﬂ  atter Phillips curve is due partly 
to the credible monetary policy, and because the inﬂ  ation-
ary impact of cost-push shocks is fairly small in the light of 
stronger international competition.
Partly as a result of global ﬁ  nancial  integration,  long-
term interest rates have become more closely aligned at 
the international level, while there is evidently a weaker 
link between ofﬁ  cial interest rates and long-term interest 
rates. These developments appear to suggest that the 
traditional interest rate channel has become less effective. 
That ﬁ  nding, too, needs to be qualiﬁ  ed, since the severing 
of the link with the long-term interest rate is largely due 
to the ﬁ  rm anchoring of inﬂ  ation expectations. Moreover, 
good communication regarding the economic and mon-
etary analyses conducted can provide an additional instru-
ment for steering long-term interest rates.22
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